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Antônio Cota Marçal, Belo Horizonte / Brazil 
Paula Maria Nasser Cury
*, Heidelberg / Germany  
 
Ethics and Science in Brazilian Legal Discourse 
 
Abstract: The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 declares Brazil as a Democratic State of Law. This 
formally  democratic  legal  status  has  been  facing  difficulties  when  it  comes  to  its  material 
implementation. Brazilian legal procedures are still greatly influenced by the catholic heritage from 
Portugal in the times of colonization, translated in the present times into a strong moral set of dogmas 
that still reflects upon the legal production and interpretation in the country. Recently in Brazil, a 
debate brought to the Supremo Tribunal Federal, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, has evidenced 
the struggle between Ethics and Morality in the country’s legal scenario. The focus of the discussion 
was the possibility of abortion of anencephalic fetuses (in Brazil, abortion in considered a crime 
against life). In order to properly ground its decision, the Court invited scientists, doctors, members of 
feminist  movements  and  representatives  of  certain  religions  to  a  public  dialogue,  in  which  both 
scientific-technical and purely moral-religious arguments were presented. Although these procedures 
encouraged and promoted a democratic and pluralistic legal debate, it seems like the crucial point of 
the discussion were not taken into account: the scientific character of Law. This is the object of the 
present manuscript: in order to ensure an intersubjective construction and application of Law, this 
must be perceived as an Applied Social Science and judges, lawyers, legislators and all other legal 
actors  must proceed  in  a scientific  way.  To  illustrate  the theme,  the  specific case  of  abortion of 
anencephalic fetuses will be mentioned through the text.   
Keywords: Brazilian Legal System, Intersubjectivity, Scientificity, Law as an Applied Social Science. 
 
I. Introduction 
Although  Brazil  constitutionally  declares  itself  a  Democratic  State  of  Law,  committed  to 
democracy and to the enforcement of human rights, in many aspects its material independence 
from religion and other spheres of subjective morality has not been reached yet. As a result, 
the  recursion  to  anti-democratic  and  therefore  authoritarian  legal  concepts  is  still 
commonplace in the current legal practices and debates. This has severe implications for the 
scientific status of the Brazilian legal system. For, if Law is to be considered a science and, as 
such, is to be rationally justified on the basis of non-dogmatic concepts which are open to 
review and actualization, then it must be possible to proceed in a scientific way in regard to 
the legal norm and the interpretation of its content.  
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This  impasse  between  Ethics  and  Morality,  between  intersubjective 
construction/interpretation and dogmatic content of Law; ultimately, between Law as Science 
and Law as some sort of heteronomous discourse, can be greatly exemplified by the so-called 
ADPF  54-8.  The  ADPF  (Arguição  de  Descumprimento  de  Preceito  Fundamental)  is  a 
constitutionally established means to report the violation of constitutional prescriptions. In the 
ADPF 54-8, the alleged offense to the constitutional order consists in the legal prohibition of 
abortion in the specific situation in which the fetus is proven to be anencephalic
1.  
According to the penal legislation currently in force in Brazil, abortion is considered to 
be a crime against life, punishable  with imprisonment for up to ten years. The practice of 
abortion would be technically not punishable only if the mother’s life were at risk and could 
not  be  saved  by  other  means,  or  if  the  pregnancy  resulted  from  rape.  To  sustain  this 
prohibition, Brazilian Law relies on a concept of “life” that is mostly grounded on religious 
and moral beliefs, a concept that is not based or even influenced by the actual scientific 
evidences  regarding  to  the  matter  of  life  and  its  beginning.  Even  though  the  Brazilian 
Constitution  states  that  Brazil  is  a  secular  State,  legislation  and  legal  decisions  keep 
employing  moral  contents  in  the  legal  discourse,  describing  bad  practices  as  “sinning 
behaviours”, life as  a  “gift  of  god” and human person as  “a complete and unchangeable 
entity”. Ethics and catholic Morality are still considered synonymous by many. In the above-
mentioned ADPF 54-8, the influence of such factors in the judicial argumentation itself is 
explicit. This can demonstrated in the following parts of the debates, among others:  
 
I am not convinced by the argument that the anencephalic fetus is condemned to death. All of us are, all of 
us were born to die. What cannot be subject to the power of disposal of the other people is the duration of 
life. This is the crucial juridical reason why not only infra-constitutional norms, but also the Constitution 
protects life. Because, from the moment in which, independently from the nosological classification of the 
anencephalic fetus, we transform it in object of others’ power of disposal, this life would become a thing 
(res), [...]. (Min. Cezar Peluso, Questão de Ordem na ADPF 54-8, p. 93). 
*  *  *   
                                                           
1 The above-mentioned ADPF 54-8 objectifies that the abortion of anencephalic fetuses be legally permitted in 
Brazil, under the argument of impossibility of survival outside the mother’s uterus. This would lead, according 
to the claimer, to a situation that would not be technically considered ‘abortion’, but anticipation of birth. 
Besides, obliging a woman to hold a pregnancy under these conditions would be a violation of her dignity, of 
legality, freedom, autonomy and of her right to health. Science is, according to the claimers, able to demonstrate 
that there is no possibility of development of an autonomous life in such cases, and this scientific statement, 
achieved through medical exams and reports, should be a ground for the permission of a pregnancy’s 
interruption. At first had the judge in charge of the ADPF 54-8, Marco Aurélio de Mello, asserted in an 
injunction decision that the mother has a constitutional right to interrupt the pregnancy when the fetus is 
anencephalic. Later, the other Ministers of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court decided to revoke this injunction 
decision. The grounds given to support this position and the debates among the Ministers show that religious and 
therefore subjective moral aspects concerning the concept of life and the legal possibility of abortion were used 
as reasons to deny the injunction. After the revocation of the injunction that allowed the abortion of anencephalic 
fetuses, the course of the ADPF 54-8 went on. A final decision about the matter is still to be reached by the 
Court.   3 
We still have, in Court, a crucifix, but the separation between State/Church has happened a long time ago. I 
believe there must be, in case, technical parameters, constitutional parameters, and not moral, religious and 
even fundamentalist views about the theme. (Marco Aurélio, Questão de Ordem na ADPF 54-8, p. 83). 
 
The present article intends to critically analyze, from the example of the ADPF 54-8, the 
scientific  character  of  Law,  which  is  ultimately  at  stake  when  it  comes  to  questions  as 
abortion and the concept of life.  
 
II. Law and Scientificity 
The  scientific  construction  of  reality  by  western  modernity  is,  from  the  documental  and 
analytical point of view, and considering its theoretical and practical results, one of the most 
successful ways of exercise of rationality. Confronted with myth, with opinion and with the 
Platonic-Aristotelian episteme, contemporaneous scientificity presents itself as an egalitarian 
and intersubjective construction of objectivity.  
 
1. Science and scientificity as rational construction of objectivity 
Initially circumscribed to the western European universe, the creation of modern experimental 
science,  with  mathematical  expression  and  constructed  on  the  basis  of  reciprocal  and 
uninterrupted exchange between theory and practice was not an isolated fact
2. In this respect, 
many historical, political, climatic and intercultural phenomena must be considered. It is 
important to notice that the consolidation of modern Law as theoretical system and as social 
practice was contemporary to other scientific processes; it has assumed and kept, however, an 
epistemologically pre-modern or even anti-modern posture. The fact that Law has taken this 
position  radically  contrasts  with  the objectified  effectiveness  of  the  regulatory  function 
performed by the legal system in relation to  the othe r systems and  subsystems of the 
politically organized society. Indeed, from the perspective of normative regulation, there is no 
means to be effective without assimilating the dynamic that institutes these subsystems and 
ignoring the practical-theoretical reference patterns adopted by the subsystems on which it is 
intended to act. 
In the western European universe, the first step towards a self-structuring rationality was 
taken in Greece in the 5
th  and  4
th  centuries  B.C.,  with  the  theoretical  constitution  of  the 
episteme  in  contraposition  to  the  doxa
3.  The  episteme,  translated  to  Latin  as  science  and 
knowledge, had a highly differentiated and rationally grounded content as element or object 
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of knowledge. Aristotle
4 identified this differentiation through the explicitation of episteme as 
the knowledge of the cause or causes of the thing in question. Such knowledge, differently 
from opinion or doxa, objectified to produce a precise and accurate knowledge of the object 
of knowledge, capable of explaining this object’s real reasons or effective causes. Differently 
from  the  episteme,  opinion  doesn’t  have  the  stability  of  grounded  knowledge  and  is  not 
always  true.  For  Plato  and  Aristotle,  grounded  knowledge  was  due  to  analysis  and 
demonstration.  This  demonstratively  grounded  knowledge  could  lead  to  principles  and 
causes, previous to the object of knowledge in time and space, as well as to hypotheses, 
axioms and definitions that would work as explicative elements. Aristotle used, among other 
resources and methods, perception, memory, induction and deduction to establish and ground 
such connections that are constitutive of knowledge. Knowledge that was so produced was 
considered epistemologically adequate knowledge.  In the theoretical sphere, the Euclidian 
geometry, the Aristotelian logic, philosophy and physics were considered products of this 
rationality, as well as ethics, politics and rhetoric in the sphere of practical reason. In both 
cases, the episteme, as a work of the logos that aims at the universal and at the necessary, is a 
rationally demonstrated, constructed objectivity. Because of its axiomatic construction, on the 
one hand, and of its recourse to not completely demonstrable universal principles or primary 
causes, on the other hand, the resulting objective knowledge was extremely complex and its 
mastering demanded a good methodological initiation. 
The generalized prevalence of monotheistic religions from the 4
th century B.C. onwards 
(Judaism,  Catholicism  and,  later,  Islamism),  its  disqualifications  of  the  mundane  and  the 
instrumentalist  affirmations  of  the  human  finitude  have  discouraged  and  progressively 
precluded the development of the autonomous rationality started in Greece. The answers to 
present and possible problems would lie in the sacred texts. Institutionalized, religious belief 
excluded the exercise of rational and critical intersubjectivity. Indeed, its exercise became 
dismissed or banned because of the revealed truth, assumed or imposed as something finished 
and definitive. For Catholicism, the predominant religion for many centuries, man should 
worry about his soul, in consonance with the Plotinian Neoplatonism that has served as basis 
for the doctrinal formulations of the Patristic. The millenarianism grounded on the belief in 
the return of Christ has overcome the asceticism and the almost simultaneous monarchism, 
consolidated by Bento de Nursia. As a consequence, it was no longer justifiable to spend time 
and effort with an “impotent” rationality. 
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From the 11
th century onwards, however, various events and factors contributed to the 
gradual resumption of an autonomous exercise of rationality, without any form of control but 
the one that derived from the ethos of the free rational action. In this process, logos and ethos 
would  be  explicitly  associated.  Personal  engagement,  the  risks  assumed  in  face  of  the 
teleological and political orders, the rupture with patterns and beliefs that were  generally 
accepted due to tradition or imposition, demonstrate the presence of an ethical component of 
authenticity  and  veracity  in  the  performance  of  actors  as  Guillaume  de  Conches,  Petrus 
Abaelardus, Gioacchino da Fiore, Sygerius de Brabantia, Petrus Johannes Olivi, Marguerite 
Porete, Nicolaus von Kues, Jakob Böhme, Raimundus Lullus, Nikolaus Copernicus, Galileo 
Galilei, Giordano  Bruno, considered at  the time visionaries,  bandits,  heretics,  ignorant  or 
crazy
5. 
The events that started this process were the Crusades. Motivated by religious reasons or 
by political strategies, the Crusades led the Christian Europeans to know themselves through 
their other and initiated the process of their rational majority. A Law that was different from 
the canonic and a Christianism that was diverse from the roman in Constantinople and its 
domains. A different religion spread all over the Middle East and the north of Africa. The 
participants of the Crusades noticed that it was possible to be happy and personally free under 
a belief that was different from the one they had learned and had conceived as the only truth. 
They  noticed  their  delay  in  terms  of  knowledge  and  techniques  such  as  mathematics, 
medicine,  astronomy  and  philosophy.  They  heard  about  the  existence,  in  Cairo,  of  an 
advanced  teaching  institution  (Al-Azahr)  that  would  be  later  implemented  in  Europe  and 
named university. 
Short after the first Crusade, the Holy Roman Empire of the West began a long period 
(11
th-18
th centuries) of persecutions (torture, exclusions and executions) to internal dissidents 
(heretics and witches) and of bloody wars against populations that had non-Christian beliefs
6. 
Nonetheless, the intensification of intercultural exchange and the Pope’s progressive lost of 
credibility made the personal individuality revive and reason ended up prevailing in western 
Europe. A new scientificity was born. The progressive consolidation of the modern European 
national States and their respective collective individualities, the reception and dissemination 
of  the  Codex  Juris  Civilis  in  contraposition  to  Canonic  Law,  the  rediscovery  and 
dissemination of Aristotle’s writings and its following influence in the Christian theology, the 
                                                           
5 B. Gräfrath. Ketzer, Dilettaten und Genies: Grenzgänger der Philosophie. Hamburg: 1993; Markus Knapp und 
Theo Kobusch. Querdenker: Visionäre und Aussenseiter in Philosophie und Theologie. Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005. 
6 Georg Baudler. Gewalt in den Weltreligionen. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005. 6 
successive and always repressed attempts at reform inside the Church, the formation  and 
uncontrollable outbreak of personal individuality and the construction of its autonomy in the 
Lutheran Reform and in the experimental Science constitute different stages of this process of 
demystification of transcendentalized life. 
Modern  Science  emerged  from  a  long  course  of  persecutions,  camouflages, 
confrontations and self-affirmation. As the philosophical schools were closed and the non-
canonic texts were forbidden, only an externally imposed truth could prevail. Although this 
apparent unanimity regarding beliefs and practices has persisted for centuries, it was artificial 
and irrational. The contact with other religions, practices and cultures opened the perception 
of many. Those who investigated by themselves had to risk their own lives to do it. Climatic 
cycles and the consequent poor harvest and hunger, as well as the plagues, propitiated the 
formulation of questions that Theology and its reference to sin as the ground of all those 
events could no longer answer. First the alchemists, then the members of secret societies and 
finally the scientists knew that the grounds for such phenomena had to be searched in reasons 
and causes that belonged to the same dimension of reality as the one of the events they 
wanted to fight against. 
In this context, modern experimental Science (with its method of observation of data, 
construction  of  hypotheses,  identification  and  verification  of  consequences  and  variables, 
elaboration  of  universal  theoretical  statements,  construction  of  models,  application  of 
produced knowledge in technologies) revealed itself as the most egalitarian way of exercise of 
rationality. Indeed, all of the mentioned stages and methodological processes of construction 
of  new  scientific  knowledge  are  open  and,  in  this  process,  the  exercise  of  individual 
subjectivity prevails. The one who observes and experiments, who evaluates and identifies 
mistakes, who proposes alternatives for correction, who generalizes and formulates laws and 
theories  or,  finally,  the  one  who  produces  science  is  each  and  every  member  of  the 
community. What now distinguishes this process is the fact that, being all the participants 
rational  agents,  the  control  of  the practice of  rationality is  intersubjective and no longer 
extrinsic to reason. Thus, modern experimental science constitutes itself as a social practice 
of  intersubjective  construction  of  every  possible  rational  objectivity.  As  such,  modern 
scientificity conceives itself as a continued intersubjective construction that can always be 
subject to review. 
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2. Contemporary Scientificity and Law as an Applied Social Science 
Modern Science has consolidated itself because of its methodology based on a wide exercise 
of  critical  intersubjectivity  and  of  the  technological,  almost  immediate  results  that  it  has 
started  to  provide.  Though,  modern  scientificity  became  more  consistent  when  it 
accomplished  its  self-critical  process  and  integrated  to  logos  and  ethos  the  dimension  of 
pathos. Explicitated since the 17
th and 18
th centuries, the pathos is the dimension of emotions 
and  feelings,  interests  and  values,  desires  and  expectations.  It  deals  with  a  constitutive 
element of human finitude and historicity and, as such, it is the starter and propellant of the 
human rational agent’s performances in society. 
In the sphere of scientific and social practices, authority, tradition, subjective beliefs and 
religious convictions shared by many haven’t been considered scientific arguments since the 
beginning  of  Modernity.  The  Enlightenment  reflected  and  reinforced  this  way  of 
understanding  physical,  social  and  cultural  reality.  Observing,  measuring,  weighting, 
registering, comparing, formulating and verifying hypotheses, permanently criticizing results 
and inferences in the light of systematically built statements and theories gradually became 
standardized procedures. Repeating experiences and experimentations and expressing their 
results in mathematical univocal formulations give the new physical, chemical and biological 
sciences  a  high  degree  of  certainty  and  validity,  to  the  extent  that  they  be  considered 
epistemological and methodological reference to the other areas of knowledge. Newton led 
this process to its peak when he united investigations about universal gravity and about the 
axioms of Mechanics in one unique general theory of Physics. 
Critical,  both  internal  and  external  to  science,  progressively  forged  the  producer  of 
scientific knowledge as the new inventor of human social, cultural and environmental reality. 
Empiricism and Rationalism, Materialism and Idealism were expressions of the discussions 
and  confrontations  concerning  the  grounding  of  knowledge  in  general  and  of  scientific 
knowledge  in  particular.  This  exercise  of  intersubjectivity  turned  religious  belief  into  a 
private,  subjective  matter,  while  science  assumed  the  management  of  intersubjectively 
objective  knowledge  in  the  public  and  private  spheres.  Conditioned  by  technical  and 
methodological  instruments  and  resources  provided  by  the  rational  human  agent  and  the 
perspectives opened by the pathos, truth became a relational and intersubjective construction 
in cultural time and space. 
Locke and Hume, Leibniz and Kant, Rousseau, as well as Julien de La Mettrie, Paul 
Henry d’Holbach, Hegel and his criticism to idealism and metaphysic were different steps in 
this process of self-constitution and self-comprehension of scientificity. From this long and 8 
fruitful  interaction  among  multiple  specialists  resulted  the  understanding  that  reality  is  a 
process  that  cannot  be  reduced  to  things  and  artifacts  given  to  perception.  Elements  of 
different  dimensions  integrate  this  process,  such  as  conceptual  contents,  beliefs  and 
convictions, data and facts, hypotheses, theories, systems, institutions, interests, values and 
virtual entities. Reality became what man makes of himself and of the state of things in which 
he acts and interacts.  
While the above-mentioned process was developed through the conception and practice 
of  scientificity,  Law  assumed  the  function  previously  performed  by  the  ecclesiastical 
institution  (church)  regarding  right  and  wrong  in  the  social  and  political  domains.  The 
regulation of public and private behaviour was, then, no longer a matter of religious belief. 
Correctness and its regulatory content became also an intersubjective construction shared by 
the members of politically organized groups. 
However, Law kept seeing itself as a subordinated system to support and preserve the 
established power and order. It kept using the same dead language (Latin) that the population 
of the modern States did not know, it kept making use of pomp and rituals from the past and, 
above  all,  it  did  not  change  its  authoritarian  and  conservative  posture  in  performing  its 
functions. In brief words, Law did not constitute itself as science and kept speaking for itself, 
which, by the way, is consistent with the self-alienation that Law has always kept in relation 
to a reality in a permanent state of construction. The use of previously constituted rituals and 
formulas  that  avoid  surprises  demands  less  rational  effort  and  provides  more  stability. 
Although  legislators,  judges,  theorists  and  other  agents  of  Law  were  confronted  with 
Historicism, with  the idealistic movement  of systematization of practices  and knowledge, 
with Positivism and the new social and political dynamic towards a higher democratization, 
they ignored the epistemological change that surrounded them. To stick firmly to logic in the 
grounding  of  Law  and  the  generalized  employment  of  subsumption  as  the  method  of 
application of norms are perhaps the most significant characteristics of Law in this period of 
time. In clear opposition to what was happening in science in general, Law (particularly the 
Legislature and the Judiciary) kept excluding citizens and specialists in different areas of 
knowledge from the tasks of critical elaboration, construction and development of Law and its 
practices. Law turned itself into a world apart from the real social and political world. 
The claim that Law, as an applied social science, could not have adopted the scientific 
methodology  in  development  in  those  times  cannot  be  theoretically  justified  and  has  no 
historic grounds. Each area of scientific knowledge has specificities and, even so, they keep 
using scientific procedures and methodologies. What happens is that Law has not critically 9 
followed  the  methodological  movement  that  took  place  after  Kant’s  critics  to  the 
metaphysical grounding of Science.   
Indeed, in the second half of the 19
th century and under the influence of Romanticism, 
especially that from Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey (1831-1911) sustained the existence of 
a  dichotomy  between  understanding  and  explaining  –  these  would  be,  respectively,  the 
methods  of  human  sciences  (Geisteswissenschaften)  and  natural  sciences 
(Naturwissenschaften).  While  the  natural  scientist  would  explain  the  phenomena  of  the 
physical world based on the construction of hypotheses and its correlation to collected data 
and observed facts, the scientist of the spirit would understand historical and social reality 
based  on  his  own  life  experiences  and  actions.  Institutions,  rules,  works  and  monuments 
produced  by  humans  would  be  the  primordial  objects  of  understanding  because  they 
contained the meanings conferred to the world by the human agent
7. This comprehension of 
science  opposes  understanding  and  explaining  and,  besides,  wrongly  names  ‘methods’ 
complex  rational  activities,  mostly  logical  and  epistemological,  present  in  all  sorts  of 
scientific knowledge. 
Law’s  alienation  in  regard  to  the  methodological  changes  was  shared  also  by 
philosophers,  psychologists,  sociologists  and  other  specialists  considered  members  of  the 
‘human  or  cultural  sciences’.  Fact  is  that,  contemporary  to  Dilhtey’s  initiative  and 
independent from it, some scientists and philosophers promoted, in the Mathematics and in 
Logics, a movement destined to rethinking the grounds of these sciences. This initiative, in a 
route opposite to the one followed by Dilthey, would end up methodologically approximating 
all sciences. 
Frege (1848-1925), physicist, chemist, mathematician and logician, and Peirce (1839-
1914), physicist, chemist, astronomer and philosopher, were well-known representatives of 
this  movement,  in  which  Hilbert,  Dedekind,  Cantor,  Peano  and,  by  extension,  Carnap, 
Bertrand Russell and Edmund Husserl also took part. Central objects of the works of these 
researchers  were  language,  meta-language,  the  construction  of  a  technical  language  for 
science, the creation of new methods to develop and ground scientific conceptual contents. 
The results of these studies decisively influenced the Philosophy of the 20
th century, from 
Analytical Philosophy to the present Neopragmatism, especially the Philosophies of Science 
and Language. This movement, developed through dialogues, live discussions and exchange 
of letters, was an explicit exercise of interactive production in the community of scientists. 
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As to the methodology of Law, an applied social science, it is important to note that the 
self-criticism initiated in the formal sciences was extended to the other natural sciences and 
ended up introducing, in the 20
th century, the ideas of finitude, historicity and the qualitative 
element in the methodology and self-comprehension of the so-called hard sciences. Before 
and  independently  from  any  competent  questioning  about  scientificist  positivism,  from 
Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976) to Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996), through Kurt Gödel (1906-
1978) and Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962), the natural sciences themselves demonstrated that 
the ‘exact’ sciences are also submitted to internal and external limits. And it couldn’t be 
different, since such sciences are produced in finite and contingent time and space, through 
the employment of the available methods and techniques and in concurrence with interests 
and values of the societies in which the scientists live and act.  
Finitude and contingency start to integrate the self-comprehension of natural sciences in 
the  first  decades  of  the  20
th  century,  as  a  result  of  critical  work.  The  principle  of 
indetermination, formulated by Heisenberg in 1927, according to which, when it comes to 
physical  magnitudes,  quantum  mechanics  cannot  precisely  and  simultaneously  determine 
variables such as place, impulse, time and energy, showed that the sciences are not effectively 
exact and necessary, but operate with probabilities and contingencies
8. Another element, this 
time concerning the concept of finitude, was identified in researches about the specification of 
a comprehensive system of axioms, able to simultaneously  ground mathematics and to 
prevent  the  derivation  of  contradictions.  Gödel,  in  1931,  formulated  the  principle  of 
incompleteness of formal systems. Incompleteness consists in the fact that every system, even 
a formal one, is not able to justify and explain itself without using additional external 
elements
9. 
The process of intersubjective construction of natural sciences kept on and integrated, 
with Bachelard and Thomas Kuhn,  historicity  and  social  practices  in  the  construction  of 
science. Researcher of the epistemology of natural sciences, Gastón Bachelard forged the 
concept of epistemological obstacles. These consist of convictions and previous knowledge, 
normally assumed without questioning and criticizing. Observation and the history of science 
would have led Bachelard to sustain that scientific progress is mostly due to the correction of 
previously groundless knowledge, turned into obstacles to science. In this context, Bachelard 
affirms  that  science  is  an  approximated,  precarious  knowledge  for  it  bases  itself  on 
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experiences and verifications that can be contested and overcome at any time and place
10. In 
his turn, Thomas Kuhn provided another element to the assimilation of the qualitative factor 
by the natural sciences when he showed that science does not progress linearly, but due to 
self-corrections  that  can  represent  deep  changes.  Neither  in  its  results  nor  in  its  self -
constitution is science absolute. Science is a complex process of theoretical and p ractical 
correlations,  a  network  of  relationships,  in  which  history,  values,  beliefs,  theories  and 
practices interpenetrate each other and reciprocally interact
11. 
Today, quantitative and qualitative methods are currently used in human and natural 
sciences. It is also considered commonplace that observation interferes with what is being 
observed. It is a fact, however, that the natural sciences advanced more in the critic to 
scientificism, when compared to the human sciences. In this sense, it is symptomatic that, still 
in the 1960s, philosophers and sociologists were debating the scientificist positivism, while 
not even one natural or formal scientist took part in this discussion anymore
12. An even 
clearer symptom is that the Philosophy and Theory of Law are still discussing Positivism and 
Post-Positivism in present times
13. 
It is due to the above -mentioned processes and arguments that it can be sustained that 
science is an intersubjective construction of the rationally possible objectivity, in which 
authority, tradition and appeal to the transmundane are not scientific reasons. In case there 
weren’t epistemological and practical grounds for the constitution of Law as a science, the 
plurality and the complexity of the contemporary society and the rational normativity of the 
Democratic  State  of  Law  would  suffice  to  make  the  legislator  and  other  agents  behave 
scientifically.  
 
3. Modern rationality and Brazilian Law  
In the Brazilian legal production, the participation of scientists and specialists from various 
technical areas is insignificant, not encouraged or demanded. Due to the passivity that results 
from  the  authoritarianism  and  centralism  dominating  in  the  Brazilian  legal  and  cultural 
tradition,  the  universities  and  faculties  of  Law  do  not  implement  opportunities  of 
participation, through, for example, the elaboration and presentation of projects of law, or the 
intervention in the public discussion of projects under analysis. The Brazilian legislator, with 
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few exceptions, does not have technical qualification in legistics and, generally, does not have 
basic knowledge of Law, indispensable to an appropriated legislative performance. It is also 
known  that  the  technical  staff,  that  should  compensate  the  inexistence  of  specialized 
education and information among the legislators, is not composed of specialists, but mostly of 
legislators’ relatives and party fellows.  
In a Democratic State of Law, secular and plural, the grounds for legal practices cannot 
lie in the judge’s or in the legislator’s particular religious beliefs and subjective convictions. 
Ethical transsubjective duties and public reasons, as well as evidence and results of scientific 
researches and technological improvements, must constitute his argumentative basis. In order 
to implement this, it is necessary that there be criticism inside and outside the Legislative and 
the Judiciary, and above all in the judiciary apparatus, including its staff. 
Most of the times, judges still behave as if they were above the law and out of its reach. 
Many act as if they were owners of the claims to be judged, of the Courts they integrate, and 
place themselves as superiors to lawyers and parties, as if there were a hierarchy among them. 
In Brazil, there is no effective control of the Judiciary and its acts by the holders of the State 
of  Law  –  the  citizens.  The  Brazilian  Judiciary  is  not  sufficiently  democratic,  secular, 
pluralistic and scientific.  
The other agents of Law, especially lawyers and prosecutors, most of the times do not 
have a scientific legal education or a perspective of Law as an intersubjective, permanent 
construction. The citizen and the civil society do not participate as would be required in a 
Democratic State of Law. Exceptions are due to individual efforts, opening to other legal 
systems and international experiences. The faculties of Law are, in great part, endogenic in 
selecting their professors and rarely take part in interdisciplinary activities in and outside the 
university.  The  method  of  teaching  is  dogmatic  and  monologic,  the  use  of  manuals  is 
generalized.  The  language  –  as  happens  in  the  Judiciary  as  a  whole  –  is  archaic  and 
unintelligible to the common citizen, and an uncritical legalism dominates. Also under this 
aspect are the academic practices mostly retrograde, not scientific. 
 
4. Finitude and self-determination versus pre-modernity 
The  legal  conservatism  has  an  insidious  face,  whose  consequences  are  aggravated  when 
implemented in a country with authoritarian tradition like Brazil, where the civil society did 
not conquer, by its own initiative, rights and guarantees. Theoretically, Brazilian Law would 
be formulated by the State’s apparatus to protect the interests of each and every one of its 
citizens. When it comes to practice, however, a kind of paternalism prevails. It consists in not 13 
opening space for society to decide which interests are to be protected. Ignoring ethnical and 
cultural plurality, the legislative process bases itself on Christianity. Expressions like ‘the gift 
of life’, ‘interfering in the course of nature is an usurpation of the Creator’s role’, ‘the grace 
of forgiveness’, ‘under the protection of God’, both in legal decisions and in other public acts, 
proliferate in the legal scenario. Besides, religious symbols and even rituals are present in the 
places where judgments and public practices take place. Associated to the lack of scientificity 
in the reflection about Law and its construction, these beliefs exacerbate the idea of finitude 
and restrict the self-determination. Consequently, risk and unpredictability are no longer seen 
as contingencies that are constitutive of life itself, including human life. People fear risk and 
for this reason delegate the function of dealing with unpredictability to the State. But fear is 
neither  scientifically  nor  rationally  an  adequate  means  to  face  risk  and  unpredictability. 
Rational means to do it are still the identification of risk factors and possible unwanted effects 
of acts or new technologies and the consequent action to avoid or restrict the possibility that 
they  occur.  Under  these  aspects,  the  enlightened  assumption  of  one’s  own  life,  of  one’s 
choices  and decisions  and the vindication of the space to  exercise private autonomy  and 
therefore to promote personal and collective self-realization are unavoidable. 
Another pre-modern element to be overcome in the context of new Technologies and 
scientific  knowledge  is  teleology.  Although  science,  after  intensive  discussion  since  the 
Renaissance, has abandoned an old Aristotelian finalist conception, Law insists on keeping its 
old conceptual content. Teleology has to do with purposes, objectives and functions, in the 
context of explanations and justifications for behaviours and states of affairs. According to 
Aristotle, inanimate things searched for places and states that were natural to their respective 
species, the same way rational beings were driven by natural development and growth to a 
stage  of  maturity.  Things  were  so  because  there  was  a  final  cause  at  stake.  Modern 
experimental science has not subscribed this attribution of proposals to inanimate objects, 
except to those artifacts that are produced to reach certain objectives through the manipulation 
of controllably induced physical-chemical reactions. On the other side, animals and rational 
agents are governed by purposes and goals. Thus, the problem is not denying the teleology of 
intentional  action,  but  considering  teleology  as  a  pre-ordination  of  reality,  an  extrinsic 
direction that involves things and rational agents as unavoidable causes. This is, for example, 
the power attributed to ‘nature’ in situations such as the generation of life and the event of 
death. Lottery and fate would perhaps be the most appropriate denominations for these two 
situations. Because of his religious and cultural tradition, man behaves as if he were impotent 
and as if it were forbidden to act proactively in support of Law. Euthanasia and abortion of 14 
anencephalic  fetuses  exemplify  such  situation.  Being  submissive  to  these  restrictions  can 
mean giving up on rationality and ceasing to be the author of one’s own self-realization. 
   
III. Conclusion 
It can be noticed that not only Legislative and Judiciary as formal instances of production and 
development of Law act in a pre-modern, not democratic way. Civil society seems to be inert 
in face of this situation. Under the Portuguese colonial regime, that did not experience the 
Enlightenment and was initially connected to Canonic Law via Patronage, and even after the 
proclamation of the Brazilian republic, Brazil has never been able to educate the subjects of 
Law and holders of the State to the exercise of citizenship. Although an archaic Penal Code is 
still in force, a Code that contradicts the Constitution of 1988, although the individuals are 
governed by a civil process in which the citizen has little or even no voice and the judge has 
absolute control over the procedures, only now, twenty-four years after the re-democratization 
of the country, the first attempts to criticize and change positive Law start to arise. Not only 
agents and thinkers of Law, but also universities and faculties of Law avoid taking part in the 
legislative process, in the development of Law, in the public exercise of the right to criticize 
and disagree. As a result, the State is formally, but not effectively democratic – not effectively 
democratic because, among other reasons, the Legislative has not  yet regulated important 
aspects of the Constitution, because the Judiciary still decides on the basis of private, moral 
beliefs, because the lawyers themselves frequently have a shy, bad performance.  
The ADPF 54-8 illustrates well this situation. Not only its content itself but also the 
posture assumed by some of the ones involved in it, the arguments presented, the language 
and even the formalist development of the debates evidence the current pre-modern status of 
Law and the legal practices in Brazil.  
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